This paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias, a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for possible repetitions in the information they receive. The results indicate that network structure plays a signicant role in determining social inuence. However, the most inuential agents are not those with more outgoing links, as predicted by the persuasion bias hypothesis, but those with more incoming links. We show that a boundedly rational updating rule that takes into account not only agents' outdegree, but also their indegree, provides a better explanation of the experimental data. In this framework, consensus beliefs tend to be swayed towards the opinions of inuential listeners. We then present an eort-weighted updating model as a more general characterization of information aggregation in social networks.
Introduction
In many social and economic situations communication among individuals is determined by social networks (Jackson, In this paper we test experimentally whether the evolution of beliefs of individuals communicating through a social network reects the structure of the network itself, and in particular, whether these beliefs are consistent with the persuasion bias hypothesis. Our results indicate that network structure plays a signicant role in determining convergence beliefs. However, contrary to the predictions of the persuasion bias hypothesis, we nd that the most inuential agents are not those with more outgoing links, but those with more incoming links: consensus beliefs tend to be swayed towards the opinions of inuential listeners. In order to explain this nding, we propose a generalized updating rule to describe social learning that takes into account agents' indegree (the number of individuals they listen to) in addition to their outdegree (the number of individuals they talk to). We show that this alternative updating rule provides a much better characterization of the experimental data.
Finally, we present an eort-weighted updating model as a more general framework for understanding information aggregation in social networks. In this framework, based on Ballester et al. (2006) , agents optimally choose the eort exerted in processing information. Intuitively, when aggregating information is costly, individuals will choose an optimal eort level on the basis of their position in the social network. Since individuals with higher indegree are in a better position to aggregate information, they generate a positive information externality for their neighbors. Individuals with lower indegree will therefore devote less eort to processing information. Thus, in equilibrium, less weight will be attributed to the beliefs of those who exert less eort, and consensus beliefs will be swayed towards the opinions of individuals with higher indegree.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents the theoretical predictions and hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 discusses the experimental results. Section 6 presents a simple theoretical framework of information aggregation within a social network. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
This work relates to the extensive theoretical literature on social learning.
This literature can be generally divided into two main strands: one that fo-cuses on Bayesian learning and the other that deals with myopic or boundedly rational learning.
The literature on Bayesian learning originates from the contributions of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) , who assume an exogenous sequential structure in which each agent, after observing all past actions, optimally updates her belief on an unknown pay-o relevant state of the world and makes a single irreversible choice accordingly. Subsequent papers by Smith and Sorensen (1998), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) , and Acemoglu et al. (2010) consider situations where individuals observe only a subset of past actions. These studies dier from the present one in two aspects: rst, agents act sequentially and each individual has only one decision node; second, they focus on characterizing the asymptotic properties of dierent social networks under Bayesian learning. In particular, they study whether in the limit, as the size of the social network becomes arbitrarily large, individuals converge to payo-maximizing actions. In this context, as the action space is discrete while the signal space is continuous, optimality of convergence is non trivial under Bayesian learning.
The setup introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2010) is closer to our contribution, as it provides a representation of learning in social networks. In this framework, it is assumed that agents know the identity of the individuals whose information they observe. This is in contrast to Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Smith and Sorensen (1998) where individuals observe a representative sample of the overall population without knowing the identity of those whose actions they observe. However, in Acemoglu et al. (2010) the network structure has a slightly dierent role compared with the present work, in that it simply determines the set of past actions observed once by the agents and therefore does not imply an ongoing interaction between network members. In this respect, our contribution is more closely related to Gale and Kariv (2003) , who study the convergence and optimality of learning when the network structure is xed and individuals repeatedly take simultaneous actions observing the past actions of those to which they are connected in the network.
Among the papers belonging to the non-Bayesian learning branch of the literature, the most closely related to ours are Goyal (1998, 2001 are therefore subject to persuasion bias, convergence beliefs will depend on the network structure. More specically, under certain conditions, beliefs converge to a consensus given by a weighted average of agents' initial beliefs, where the weights represent individuals' social inuence and depend on the number of outgoing links associated with the position of each agent. This setting provides an optimal testing ground to evaluate how social networks inuence belief formation and is therefore the framework for our experiment. 3 The motivation for our choice is that allowing actions to be continuous provides a richer context for analyzing how dierent social networks may aect the convergence of beliefs. When actions are binary, only switching behavior can be used to infer a change in a subject's beliefs, but it is impossible to observe whether individual beliefs tend to be swayed in the direction of more inuential individuals. Continuous actions, instead, allow us to measure the direction and intensity of persuasion bias.
1 The present work is also related to the mathematical sociology literature on social networks (DeGroot, 1974 , Bonacich, 1987 , Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001 ). Sociological studies on social networks have proposed several indexes of power, centrality, and status that are close to the notion of social inuence discussed here, as they depend on the structure of the social network. 
The Experiment
The experiment is designed to test whether individuals communicating through a social network are subject to persuasion bias and, in particular, whether social inuence ultimately reects the structure of the social network. We 4 In this section, we describe the experimental task, treatments and procedures. The next section presents the theoretical predictions and hypotheses to be tested.
Baseline game
The experimental task involves four individuals interacting over 12 rounds).
Each individual is assigned a letter (A, B, C and D) identifying his position in the social network. The position and identity of the group components remain unchanged and anonymous throughout the task. Detailed instructions distributed to the subjects are reported in Appendix 1.
At the beginning of the task, each subject is assigned an integer number (signal) randomly generated by the computer. 5 Signals are generated as follows. Each group of four subjects is assigned an integer number drawn from a uniform distribution between 100 and 9999. Signals observed by group members are then drawn from a normal distribution with mean equal to the groupspecic randomly selected number and standard deviation equal to 50. to an unknown parameter that has to be guessed. In our experiment, instead, each of the four group components receive a randomly drawn number, and the unknown parameter is the average of the four numbers. This substantially simplies the experimental task, while leaving the theoretical properties unaected.
7 For example, if the mean of the four signals is 803.25 and the subject's choice in the selected round is 792, the absolute value of the dierence is 11.25 and then the monetary reward is equal to 8.75 euro. If the dierence is greater than 20, the payo is 0; for of one round randomly selected at the end of the experiment. There are no show-up fees.
From the second round onwards, each subject is informed by the computer of the choices made in previous rounds by the subjects he is connected to according to the network structure. In each round every subject thus observes the previous choices made by his neighbors. The network structure is illustrated in the instructions and each subject's screen displays it during the task.
Treatments
The experiment is based on two treatments, T1 and T2, implemented in a between-subjects design. The two treatments dier with respect to the structure of the communication network, while keeping constant the set of signals received by the subjects.
In T1, the control treatment, the communication structure is determined by the circle network, represented in Figure 1 . This is a strongly connected and balanced network, where each agent has one incoming link and one outgoing link. Treatment T2 is obtained by adding two links to the circle network, so that the choices made by subject A are observed by every other group member, while the choices of all other subjects are observed by only one subject ( Figure 2 ). In this strongly connected and unbalanced network, subject A instance, if the mean of the signals is 62.5 and the relevant guess is 30.5, the dierence is 32 and the subject does not earn anything, as 20 − 32 < 0.
8 A network is connected if, for any two agents i and j, there is a sequence i 1 , . . . , i K such that i 1 = i, i K = j, and i k is connected to i k+1 for k = 1, ..., K − 1. 
Procedures
We ran two sessions for T1 and four sessions for T2. In each session, 24 subjects were randomly divided into 6 groups of four subjects. The position and identity of the four group components remained unchanged throughout the session. Overall, the experiment involved 144 subjects, mainly undergraduate students of Economics recruited by email through an online system.
The experiment was conducted at EELAB (University of Milan Bicocca) in
November 2009 using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each session lasted approximately 80 minutes, including instructions, control questions and payments.
Average earnings were 14.5 euros.
Each session consisted of three phases of 12 rounds, for a total of 36 rounds in each session. In each phase, the experimental task was implemented with a new set of signals. The task was repeated three times in order to make it familiar to subjects, so that noise due to task misunderstanding was reduced. At the end of each phase, subjects were informed of the four signals, their mean, and the choices made by each subject. By choosing 12 communication rounds, we created a situation in which beliefs converge under both persuasion bias and rationality. If all agents were rational, four rounds would be sucient for convergence. If all subjects followed a persuasion bias updating rule, after 12 rounds beliefs would be virtually identical.
The task was explained at the beginning of each session: instructions were read aloud and any questions about the game were answered individually.
Before the game started, every subject was asked written control questions in order to check if the task was fully understood. The instructions explicitly explained to participants that the best choice when knowing or being able to deduct a given number of signals is the average of these signals. The reason for this is that we wanted to ensure that subjects knew how to optimally aggregate information if all the signals were public information, thus being able to focus exclusively on the process of social learning.
In order to prevent possible mistakes caused by the fact that individuals might forget their guesses from previous rounds or other relevant pieces of information, each participant's monitor displayed the subject's past choices and the pieces of information received in previous rounds. In this way, we induced a game of perfect recall and controlled for memory eects on decision making. In order to minimize computation mistakes, we also provided subjects with a calculator on the computer screen.
Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
Let y i,t denote the guess of individual i in round t, and y t the vector of guesses of all individuals within a group in round t. without rationally discounting the fact that only a part of it is new, while the remaining part has already been communicated in previous rounds. The evolution of beliefs can be described by the updating rule
where L is a matrix with elements ij = (q ij π ij ) / j q ij π ij and π ij denotes the precision that agent i assigns to agent j's belief. 
where L is the updating matrix and λ t ∈ (0, 1). Values of λ t closer to zero imply that individuals have more persistent opinions, while values closer to 1 imply that individuals place equal weights on the beliefs of all those they are connected to (including themselves).
As long as agents are not too xed in their beliefs and the network is strongly connected, under persuasion bias the beliefs of individuals should converge. Dierent values of λ t can aect the speed of converge but not the convergence itself as well as the consensus beliefs, as long as ∞ t=1 λ t = ∞. Since we focus on convergence beliefs, we set λ t = 1 in every period t, without loss of generality.
Beliefs in round t can therefore be written as y t = L t−1 x. As we consider strongly connected networks, where no agent is isolated, beliefs will converge over rounds. Denoting with w p the vector of weights characterizing consensus beliefs under persuasion bias, we obtain lim t→∞ y t = w p x.
In T1, a balanced and strongly connected network, consensus beliefs under persuasion bias will be the same as under rationality. In T2, an unbalanced and strongly connected network, consensus beliefs under persuasion bias will instead dier from rational consensus beliefs. Given that agents fail to account for repetitions of information, more connected agents are more inuential in equilibrium. Summing up, the hypotheses to be tested can be stated as follows:
H 0 : w
Under the null hypothesis of rationality, each agent should be equally inuential in both T1 and T2. Under the alternative hypothesis of persuasion bias, social inuence weights should be equal in T1 but dierent in T2.
Subjects A and, to a lesser extent, D should be more inuential in T2 than in T1, while subjects B and, to a lesser extent, C should be less inuential in T2 than in T1.
Results
This section presents the results. We start with a descriptive analysis of the main features of the experimental data. We then present formal tests of the 11 More precisely, an agent is more inuential if he is listened to by many other agents (direct social inuence) and if the agents who listen to him are themselves inuential (indirect social inuence).
hypothesis of persuasion bias by comparing across treatments the parameters that characterize social inuence. Finally, we examine by simulation an alternative updating rule that takes into account both outdegree and indegree,
showing that it provides a much better characterization of the experimental data.
Overview
In each of the 6 sessions, 6 groups of four subjects implement the experimental task three times, once for each phase, with 12 rounds for each phase.
We therefore have a total of 5184 observations at individual level, with 432
observations for each round.
The behavior of individual beliefs over successive rounds indicates substantial heterogeneity at both subject-and group-level. Overall, in the rst round, 92.4 per cent of the subjects report their own signal, while 96.3 per cent make a guess within 20 units from their own signal. Focusing on nal beliefs, in the last round 28.7 per cent of the subjects correctly guess the average of the four signals within their group. Accounting for rounding errors, 37.7 per cent of the subjects make mistakes smaller than one unit. It should be observed that the share of correct beliefs in the nal round is higher in T2 than in T1, reecting the fact that, although the network structure in T2
is not symmetric, it provides more information due to the higher number of communication links.
The heterogeneity of opinions among subjects belonging to the same group, represented by the average variance of the beliefs held by the four group components, falls steadily over successive rounds in both treatments. While the average group-level variance of beliefs is initially higher in T1 than in T2, beliefs display a relatively larger variance in T2 in the nal rounds.
Network Structure and Social Inuence
We now turn to analyzing how the structure of the network aects social inuence and, in particular, whether the dierences in social inuence between the two network structures are in the direction implied by the persuasion bias hypothesis. We study social inuence by focusing on individual beliefs in the last round. We estimate the weights of individual signals in nal beliefs, assuming that the observed nal beliefs are a linear combination of private signals plus a random error term:
where x k i is the private signal received by subject k in the group individual i is in, with k ∈ (A, B, C, D); y i,T is the belief held by individual i in the last round (T ) and ε i,T is an idiosyncratic error term.
The coecient associated to a given signal measures the social inuence of the corresponding subject. We control for the eect of outlying observations by eliminating from the sample the 10 per cent most extreme observations in either round 1 (misreported signals) or round 12 (divergent beliefs). Table   1 presents OLS estimation results. Condence intervals at the 95% level are reported in square brackets in order to assess the statistical signicance of the theoretical predictions within treatments. of subjects may not be independent. The four subjects in each group interact repeatedly over 12 rounds. In addition, the same group of four subjects performs the experimental task three times, with a dierent set of signals.
In order to allow for the possible dependence of nal-round beliefs within and across phases, we also considered test statistics and condence intervals based on standard errors clustered at group and phase level, thus assuming 36 independent observations (6 groups for each of the 6 sessions). All the results reported above for the analysis within treatments are qualitatively unaected. Between treatments, the change for subject B is not statistically signicant, due to the larger standard errors. However, the null hypothesis of no change for the weight of D can be rejected at the 0.04 level when accounting for dependence across subjects within phases and at the 0.07 signicance level when also accounting for dependence across phases.
In order to further assess the robustness of the results, we estimated social inuence weights in T2 by network position, thus taking into account the possible non-convergence of beliefs. The results, reported in Table 2 , indicate that the pattern described above is qualitatively robust. In particular, B and D are the least and the most socially inuent subjects, respectively, for each of the four subjects in the dierent network positions. Subject A is not inuent for any of the other three subjects in the social network.
Estimates of social inuence are also qualitatively unchanged when con- Summing up, the comparison of social inuence weights across treatments indicates that, contrary to the predictions of the persuasion bias hypothesis, the social inuence of A, the agent whose outdegree is exogenously increased in T2, is not higher in T2 relative to T1. Quite surprisingly, the social inuence of D is instead signicantly higher in T2. It should be noted that the latter result cannot be explained by indirect social inuence, as A is not the most inuent subject in T2. In the following subsection, we consider an alternative updating rule that may explain these ndings.
A Generalized Updating Rule
The experimental analysis indicates that, relative to a balanced network structure, increasing the number of outgoing links of subject A does not lead to a higher social inuence. On the other hand, subject D, who communicates to less agents but listens to more agents than A, becomes signicantly more inuential. One possible interpretation of this result is that, under a boundedly rational updating rule, social inuence within a social network may depend not only on the number of subjects one talks to (outdegree), but also on the number of subjects one listens to (indegree). The updating rule proposed in the persuasion bias model does not take into account the fact that some individuals receive more information than others. Beliefs of dierent agents are given equal weights, regardless of the number of agents they, in turn, listen to. In real situations, instead, it is likely that agents take into account how informed their neighbors are when updating their own opinion.
We suggest that the persuasion bias updating rule should be considered as an extreme case, whereby only outdegree matters, of a more general updating rule that also takes into account agents' indegree. We thus propose an updating rule based on a more general weighted updating matrix, whose elements are dened as follows:
where d j is agent j's indegree, ρ is a parameter between 0 and ∞ and, as above, q ij is equal to 1 if j belongs to i's listening set, and 0 otherwise. In order to assess the explanatory power of this alternative heuristic, we simulate belief dynamics over rounds for the same sets of signals used in our experiment, for ρ = 0 (persuasion bias) and ρ = 1 (weights proportional to indegree). The results of the simulations, compared with the experimental results, are presented in Table 2 and displayed in Figure 3 . The updating rule that proportionally takes indegree into account clearly outperforms the 12 It is worth noticing that the number of incoming nodes of an agent's interlocutor are part of the agent's information set only from the second round onwards, since in the rst round agents make their guesses on the basis of their own signal only. For the sake of simplicity our heuristic does not make this distinction, and assumes that agents take into account incoming nodes of those they are connected to in each communication round.
persuasion bias heuristic. When ρ = 1, not only is the pattern of social inuence weights correctly predicted in the nal round, but also the transition dynamics are remarkably similar to the ones observed in the experimental data.
13 Interestingly, while the restrictions implied by the persuasion bias hypothesis for the social inuence weights of subjects A and D in T2 are rejected by an F-test (p-value 0.00), those implied by the alternative heuristic with weights proportional to indegree cannot be rejected (p-value 0.12). Social influence weights over rounds − T2
Next, rather than restricting the attention to the cases ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, we simulate the proposed updating rule for all possible values of ρ, in order to identify the value of ρ that maximizes explanatory power for the experimental data. We thus dene the optimal ρ as the value that minimizes the sum of squared deviations, over all individuals, between observed (experimental) and 13 Note that, as mentioned above, we simulate a simplied version of the persuasion bias model of DeMarzo et al (2003), where we assume that agents place equal weights on the beliefs of all those they listen to, which is equivalent to setting λ t = 1 for every t in the original version of the model. While this assumption does not aect convergence beliefs (as long as ∞ t=1 λ t = ∞), it may aect the transition dynamics. 2 where y g,k,12 are the observed last round beliefs of agent k in group g and y ρ g,k,12 are the corresponding simulated last-round beliefs using the updating rule in (6) for a given value of ρ. Figure 4 presents the results of the simulations for ρ between 0 and 2. As clearly shown, the value of ρ that maximizes explanatory power for the experimental data is very close to one (1.03). That is, agents' behavior in the experiment is consistent with an updating rule that takes into account both outdegree and indegree, and the latter is weighted proportionally. In this section we propose a framework that is consistent with the generalized updating rule described above, and provides further insights on the individual behavior underlying our experimental results. The model we develop is an application of Ballester et al. (2006) , that relates the choices of agents to the eort levels that the network members devote to processing information.
As shown in the previous section, when formulating their beliefs agents take into account how well informed are those they listen to. Agents may perceive a dierent relative importance of their private information based on their position in the network, and this may inuence the eort they devote to combining their own beliefs on the true state of the world with the beliefs of those they listen to. More specically, agents may consider their own eort in aggregating information and that of the others as strategic substitutes or complements. Since these cross eects (or externalities) of eort may dier based on the network structure and are unobservable, the model also enables us to identify the pattern of cross eects that better explain our experimental results. More formally, our claim is that the network structure may endogenously aect utility functions of agents by inuencing the cross eects of eort. Altering the network structure therefore inuences the way in which information is aggregated and, ultimately, consensus beliefs and social inuence.
As an example, consider the unbalanced network structure of treatment 2. Our conjecture is that since A knows that D has more incoming links than him, he also knows that D is in a better position to aggregate information. Therefore, A's eort is a strategic substitute of D's. Moreover, since those who listen to A know that he listened to D, they will consider A's position for aggregating information to be more important than their own, and will therefore see their own eort as a strategic substitute for A's.
Model
As in DeMarzo et al. (2003), we assume that individuals are incapable of correctly discounting for repetitions of information, and adopt a Markovian updating rule. However, the weight assigned by subjects to the information received from neighbors depends on the level of eort that each agent devotes to processing information. In this case, eort in processing information is related to how agents aggregate the incoming stream of beliefs before making their own choice, and therefore communicating with their neighbors. The agents who devote more eort to processing information are those who are believed to more precisely aggregate the stream of incoming messages. Since agents are incapable of discounting repetitions by assumption, the best they can do is to correctly average the stream of beliefs they receive. Those who exert less eort, adopt a rule of thumb that is less informative on the true state of the world and, in equilibrium, a smaller weight will be attributed to their beliefs.
Eort levels chosen by individuals therefore determine the evolution of beliefs, but exerting eort involves a cost that can be interpreted as a cognitive cost. We assume that in each period, each agent maximizes his short-run utility, where the utility function of agent i in each period t can be written in the following way:
where c i (e i,t , e −i,t ) represents the cost function of eort, that may dier between agents but is invariant over time and depends on own eort, e i,t , and on the eort of the others, e −i,t , in period t. In every communication round, each agent receives a stream of beliefs, one from each network interlocutor, and exerts a certain amount of eort to aggregate this information. Each belief is considered to be more or less informative on the signal received depending on the eort devoted to information processing by the agent that makes the guess in the previous round. We assume that eort levels may dier between agents and may also vary over time. Therefore, agents use the eort-weighted average stream of signals to assess the true value of θ: E(θ | {y j,t−1, e j,t−1 } q ij =1 ) = E(θ | y i,t (e t−1 )), where y i,t (e t−1 ) = j q ij e j,t−1 y j,t−1 j q ij e j,t−1 (8) where e j,t−1 represents the eort devoted to information processing by agent j in period t − 1, and e t−1 is the corresponding vector of eort levels of all agents. We assume that processing information, by weighing incoming beliefs based on past eort levels, is costly. The eort devoted to processing this information determines the accuracy of each agent's belief in a given period.
We denote P as the communication process that depends on each agent's choice of eort in a given period. The eective belief of agent i in round t, y P i,t represents a signal on the eort-weighted stream of signals, for those who listen to agent i, according to the structure of the network:
We denote η P i,t as the random deviation from the ecient belief that depends on the eort exerted by agent i in period t. The communication process depends on eort through η P i,t , normally distributed with zero mean and variance equal to a function of the eort level, so that σ 2 i,t ≡ f (e i,t ), where f (e i,t ) is a non-negative decreasing function of the agent's eort level in period t.
Ignoring the costs of eort, agent i's expected loss of utility in each period is therefore a function of eort:
Notice that since the cost of eort is invariant over time, we can drop the time subscript from the expected utility, so that the expected utility of agent i including costs can be expressed as a function of eort:
From (9) In period 1, there are no costs of processing information since each agent observes his own signal only, and will therefore maximize utility by exerting the maximum amount of eort, implying that y 1 = x.
From the second round onwards, we assume that the cost of eort is
represented by the following function:
the rst term implies that each agent bears the same convex cost of eort where φ > 0; e i and e j denote the eort devoted by individuals i and j respectively to information processing, and λ represents the weight of the interaction components. Each agent may display complementarities (φ ij < 0) or substitutabilities (φ ij > 0) with respect to the eort exerted by those to which he is connected. Whenever agent i listens to agent j (i.e. q ij = 1), φ ij is dierent from 0. When φ ij is negative, eort levels are strategic complements. In other words, the greater is the eort that j devotes to processing information, the less costly it is for agent i to exert eort to process his neighbor's belief. When instead φ ij is positive, this means that j's eort is a strategic substitute for i. This captures the behavioral assumption that agents may perceive dierent incentives of devoting eort to process the beliefs of those they listen to, based on their position in the network.
We assume that φ ii = φ for each i, and that f (e i ) is linear and equal to δ − αe i , where δ and α are constants such that e i ∈ [0, δ/α] for every i. Substituting (11) in (10) the expected utility of agent i in each period t becomes:
We assume that agent i's utility is concave in his own eort, so that in the absence of cross eects, all agents will exert a positive amount of eort implying that they always have an incentive to cooperate. The cross eects of eort depend both on the network structure and on the assumptions we make on how the utility of agents in dierent network positions, depends on the eort of those with whom they are connected. As mentioned previously we claim that the network structure endogenously determines the cross eects of eort and therefore the individual preferences. This aects the equilibrium levels of eort and therefore determines the way information is aggregated.
Given e, the eort weighted listening links can be written in the following way:
where we denote the eort weighted listening matrix with L(e) = [ ij (e)].
Notice that the precision that agents assign to incoming messages, ij (e)
resembles that of (6), but in this case the weights are determined by the eort in aggregating information instead of the number of incoming links.
As we will see, in equilibrium these eort levels reect the network centrality of a given agent, which positively depends on the number of incoming links.
When agents communicate repeatedly with their direct neighbors and make their guesses by carrying out an eort weighted average of their incoming stream of signals, passing it on to those that listen to them, the resulting beliefs after t completed communication rounds are:
The evolution of beliefs, y t , therefore depends exclusively on the levels of eort chosen by the other agents. Naturally, the weighted updating rule should not be seen as an exact algorithm that individuals will apply, as this seems very unrealistic. It should instead be seen as a general tendency to weigh the messages of others based on the network structure.
We denote M = [−φ ij ] as the square matrix that represents all cross eects of eort. We use M as a short-hand for the simultaneous move game with payos (12) and strategy spaces R + . We take a neutral stance in terms of the magnitude of the positive and negative cross eect, and simply distinguish between positive and negative eects. 
Application
The results of the experimental analysis are generally consistent with our initial conjecture on the heterogeneous role played by agents in aggregating information. More specically, as shown in Table 4 , numerical analysis suggests that the greater inuence of agent D emerges only if preferences are such that both of the following conditions are satised:
1. A considers D s eort as a strategic substitute of his own.
2. C considers either A or B s eorts as strategic substitutes of his own.
These conditions have a rather intuitive interpretation that is consistent with our initial conjecture. Condition (1) implies that if D devotes a certain eort to processing information, A can avoid doing so and somehow conforms to D's belief without having to spend too much eort processing the information contained in D's belief. This assumption can for example be justied by the fact that since D has more incoming links, he potentially has greater scope for information aggregation.
The underlying rational of the second assumption is somewhat related to the rst and relies on the fact that C's incoming links come from agents that received messages from a potentially more informed agent, namely D.
In this case, therefore, either A or B (or both) are in a position to indirectly aggregate information, and C may consider either A or B's eorts as strategic substitutes of his own.
15 Our game has a unique Nash Equilbrium where the equilibrium eort levels are proportional to the Bonacich network centrality measure. This measure was proposed in sociology by Bonacich (1987) , and counts the number of all paths (not just shortest paths) that emanate from a given node and therefore is positively related to the number of incoming paths to a given node. The main conclusion of our analysis is that, as predicted by the persuasion bias hypothesis, agents fail to properly account for repetitions of information.
As a consequence, the structure of the network plays a signicant role in determining social inuence, and opinions generally tend to converge towards We proposed a generalized boundedly rational updating rule that takes into account both agents' outdegree and their indegree, while nesting persuasion bias as a special case. Intuitively, the proposed heuristic is based on the idea that agents may take into account how informed their neighbors are when updating their own opinion. We showed that our generalized updating rule provides not only a more plausible characterization of aggregation of dispersed information, but also much higher explanatory power for the experimental data. We then presented a simple theoretical model, based on the structure of complementarity and substitutability among the eorts that agents devote to processing information, that provides a general framework for characterizing information aggregation in social networks.
Overall, our analysis indicates that most of what we know partially depends on the features of the social networks through which we communicate.
In particular, due to a boundedly rational process in aggregating dispersed information, social inuence depends not only on how much agents are listened to, but also on how much they listen to. As a result, in equilibrium, consensus beliefs tend to be swayed towards the opinions of inuential listeners. 
General Instructions
• 24 subjects will take part in this experiment
• The experiment takes place in 3 phases of 12 rounds each, for a total of 36 rounds.
• At the beginning of the experiment 6 groups of 4 subjects will be formed anonymously:
Each subject will interact exclusively within each group without knowing the identity of the other three subjects.
Each of the four subjects belonging to a group will be randomly and anonymously assigned one of four dierent roles: A, B, C and D.
The composition of each group and the roles assigned to the 4 components will remain unchanged throughout the experiment.
How earnings are determined • The earnings of each subject will depend on the distance between his choice and x:
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one of the 36 rounds Individual earnings will be equal to 20 euro minus the dierence (in absolute value) between x and the choice made in the selected round.
Both x and the choices made by each subject will contain at most 2 decimal points (i.e. 1412.00 or 21.50 or 516.33)
If this dierence turns out to be negative, the subject will earn 0 euro.
• if x = 62.5 and the guess is 30.5, the dierence is 32 and earnings are 0 euro, since 20 − 32 < 0.
• In each round the choice that maximizes earnings depends on the information that each subject has on the signals:
if he knows only his own signal, the optimal choice is his own In the rst round each subject knows his own signal From the second round onwards, before making his choice, each subject will be informed by the computer of the choices made in the previous rounds by some of the components of his group, based on the structure represented in the following gure:
• Therefore, before making his choice A will be informed of the choices made by D B will be informed of the choices made by A C will be informed of the choices made by B D will be informed of the choices made by C
Feedback and Payments
• At the end of each phase the computer will show to each subject the 4 signals of his group, their mean, and the choices made.
• At the end of the experiment each subject will be shown the round the computer has selected to determine payments, the value of x for his group, the choice he made and the corresponding amount earned in euro.
• The experiment will terminate and the amount earned by each subject will be paid in cash. In order to carry out the decomposition we dene φ = min {φ ij | i = j} and φ = max {φ ij | i = j}. We then let γ = − min φ, 0 ≥ 0, λ = φ + γ ≥ 0 and g ij = (φ ij + γ)/λ setting g ii = 0, where by construction 0 ≤ g ij ≤ 1. The parameter g ij measures the relative complementarity in eorts from i's perspective with respect to the benchmark value −γ ≤ 0. This measure is expressed as a fraction of λ that is the highest possible relative complementarity for all pairs.
Appendix 2 -Equilibrium Eort Levels
The decomposition of M allows us to rewrite the utility function of each agent i in the following way: where γ corresponds to the weight assigned to the global substitutability component across all players represents, φ = (β − γ) is the second order derivative with respect to own eort (the concavity component), and λ * = λ/β denotes the weight of local interactions with respect to self-concavity.
The Nash equilibrium is unique and interior as long as λ * is low enough, more specically λ * must be less than the inverse of the norm of the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of G.
We therefore have that: M = −βI − γU + λG where I is the n-square identity matrix and U is the n-square matrix of ones. Thus G captures all the heterogeneity in M . From We derive convergence beliefs for dierent assumptions on complementarities versus substitutabilities of eorts which generate dierent G matrices through the decomposition procedure. In order to ensure comparability of results we set the weight of local complementarities with respect to selfconcavity, λ * = 1/2. This value always satises the properties for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium mentioned above. In Table 4 we present convergence beliefs for ve relevant cases.
